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From flywheel to fanbelt: the crises of 1973-75 and 1979-82 - had a chilling impact 
growing importance of on demand in emerging markets especially on those who were not commodity exposers. 
emerging markets The period since 1990 shows an even harsher col- 
Emerging markets are no longer acting as the lapse in inter-industrialized country trade, reflecting 
flywheel on industrialized country growth. They are the deflationary shock of the massive expansion in 
playing an increasingly powerful role in world trade, cheap manufacturing capacity in emerging markets. 
and their burgeoning demand has softened the For the first time in 30 years, real exports among 
impact of the last recession in industrialized industrialized countries have fallen in absolute terms. 
countries. Emerging markets now account for a However, exports to emerging markets have shown 
significant podion of US multinationals' profitability. rapid growth at the very moment that trade among Street offers a growing "emerging market" play. the industrialized countries has collapsed. Emerging 
No longer a flywheel markets have helped to lead industrialized countries 
out of the last recession, and the disinflationary 
Emerging markets have traditionally been regarded impact of their competitive manufacturing sectors 
as a "flywheel on the G7 economic engine" - in other may well be acting as a "fanbelt" which restrains 
words, they are only able to grow when the indus- cyclical overheating tendencies in the G7. 
trialized countries are growing. The evidence shows 
that this view is no longer valid in recent years. In Leading the G7 out of recession? 
fact, during the last G7 recession, not only did As Chart 4 on page 9 shows, over the last four 
emerging market demand expand - in absolute years, halfofthe real increase in exports from indus- 
and relative terms - but for the first time it contributed trialized countries has been attributable to rising 
significantly to keeping industrialized countries' demand from emerging markets. Since the 1991 
export sectors alive. recession hit the industrialized countries, the impact 
Chart 1 below tracks the real growth of exports from of emerging IY~arket dm~and has been even more 
industrialized countries over the past 30 years. Until significant. Between 1991 and 1993, trade among 
last year, there has been a very tight correlation industrialized countries declined by 8% in real terms. 
between the growth of trade among industrialized However, their overall exports remained constant, 
countries and the growth of trade from industrialized mainly because of burgeoning demand from 
countries to those currently defined as "emerging emerging markets. 
markets." The two great inflationary shocks to trade (continued on page 8) 
among industrialized countries - related to the oil 
oil") is appended at the 
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The export sector in industrialized countries has important market for industrialized countries' exports 
been growing in importance in recent years. IMF since the late 1970s. Between 1976 and 1993, their 
data show the export sector's share growing from an share of industrialized countries' exports has more 
average of 7.9% of GDP for all industrialized than doubled from 5.8% to 13.3%. For most of that 
countries in 1985-89 to 9.7% of GDP in 1990-93. time, they have been gaining at the expense of other 
(Needless to say, imports as a share of GDP have emerging markets. However, since 1991, exports to 
also been growing during this period.) The other emerging markets began to pick up. Chart 3 
acceleration of exports from indus- below shows that in 1993 all regions 
trialized countries to emerging (even the oil exporters) accounted 
markets has therefore come at Exports to emerging for a growing share of industrialized 
precisely the time when exports are markets in 1993 were the countries' exports 
playing a more significant role in 
industrialized countries' GDP 
of 2-2% of However, just as the recycling 
growth. industrialized countries ' mania of the 1 970s permitted a 
GDP. temporary increase in purchasing Exports to emerging markets in power in Latin America, the current 
1993 were the equivalent of 2.2% of booming demand for industrialized 
industrialized countries' GDP. Exports between countries' exports is being stimulated by manic 
industrialized countries declined by 8% in real terms capital flows to emerging markets. Is this flow as 
between 1991 and 1993, while their overall exports fickle as that of twenty years ago? 
remained constant in real terms. Therefore, the The evidence suggests not. OPEC and Latin growth of their exports to the rest of the world (which American import demand in the 970s was related Chart 4 on page 9 shows is dominated by their 
almost exclusively to infrastructure and consumption- 
exports to emerging markets) was the equivalent of 
related sectors, Imports by emerging markets .rice 0.6% of industrialized countries' GDP. the mid-1980s have been dominated by capital 
A turning point goods destined to expand their export capacity. 
Although the overall share of industrialized countries' The corollary is that foreign direct investment (FDI) 
exports to emerging markets is now not much higher flows to emerging markets have increased dramati- 
than was the case in 1963, there appears to have cally, which implies that a growing portion of the 
been a secular turning point in recent years. Asian profits accruing to multinational corporations now 
developing countries have been an increasingly come from emerging markets. 
3: Industrialized countries' exports to emerging markets 
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4: Exports from industrialized countries, 1989-93 
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6: US multinational corporations -- net profit margins by region 
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Source: Survey of Current Business; EMA estimates for 1993-94. 
The multinationals' profitability 
Over the past half century, US-based multinational 
corporations (M NCs) have been drawing an increas- 
ing share of their net earnings from affiliates outside 
of the United States. This impact is evident in Chart 
5 on page 9. Expressed in real terms, domestic 
earnings over the 1948-94 period have grown only 
marginally, rising at an average annual rate of about 
I %. Foreign profits, on the other hand, expanded 
almost ten times as fast, growing at a brisk rate of 
9.9% per annum. The consequence was that the 
share of net corporate profit coming from foreign 
operations surged to over 25%, up from only 7% in 
the late 1940s. 
This relative ascent was not linear, of course, with 
notable declines occurring in the early 1 960s, in the 
late 1970s, and most recently during the late 1980s 
and the early 1990s. Downturns in this ratio were 
invariably associated with cyclical profit upswings in 
the US causing domestic earnings to rise faster than 
foreign ones. Since foreign profits continue to 
increase, their share in the total will likely resume its 
upward trend once the current US expansion starts 
running out of steam. Until the late 1970s, the shift 
7: US multinational corporations -- 
net profit from "emerging markets" affiliates as a share of worldwide total 
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8: US foreign direct investment by region 
35,000 
foreign direct investment 
heading into "emerging 
-5,000 /I 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Source: Survey of Current Business 
toward foreign profits was primarily the result of 
expansion by US MNCs into other industrialized 
countries, mainly in Western Europe and Canada. 
Since the early 1980s, however, the growth rate of 
profits from affiliates in these countries started to 
decelerate and, from the late 1980s onward, was 
surpassed by the much faster rise in earnings 
coming from emerging markets. So far, the 
heightened significance of emerging markets comes 
not from a differential growth in their sales (which 
since 1982 remained remarkably stable at around 
7.5% of the worldwide total for US MNCs), but rather 
from rapidly expanding profit margins. 
Chart 6 on page 10 focuses specifically on US 
MNCs and shows the striking divergence in net 
profit margins (computed as a ratio of net profit after 
taxes to sales revenues). The data here aggregate 
parent and affiliate operations in the industrialized 
countries (North America, Western Europe and 
Japan), and contrast these with affiliate operations 
in emerging markets. Since 1982, the combined 
profit margin for the industrialized countries fluctu- 
ated mildly between 3.2% and 5.6%. Affiliates in 
emerging markets, on the other hand, have seen 
their own margins rise from 5% to over 9% in just a 
few years. The result of this divergence, charted in 
Chart 7 on page 10 was that the contribution of 
reflects lower taxation, lax government regulations 
and environmental standards, and in many cases 
also weaker competitive pressures. These factors 
usually do not change very quickly. Profitability, 
however, is also subject to other considerations -- 
such as exchange rate and monetary policies, or 
political upheavals -- which in emerging markets 
tend to be more erratic and less predictable. The 
upshot is that although earnings from emerging 
markets are likely to continue and grow in signifi- 
cance, this growth will probably be more volatile 
than the earlier expansion of affiliates in the 
industrialized countries. 
FDI 
With capital following the profit compass, it is hardly 
surprising that emerging markets have taken the 
lead in attracting US foreign direct investment. Chart 
8 above shows that while current US investment in 
Canada, Western Europe and Japan is not much 
different from what it was in 1985, direct capital 
inflows into emerging markets have risen more than 
six fold over the same period. In 1992, US foreign 
direct investment in emerging markets rose for the 
first time to surpass similar investment in the 
industrial countries, making emerging markets the 
largest current recipients of US productive finance. 
emerging-markets affiliates to total US MNCs profits So far, the geographic distribution of profits was 
has doubled, rising to an estimated 18% in 1994 mainly affected by disproportionately higher profit 
from only 9% in 1988. margins in emerging markets, but with capital 
spending now increasingly skewed in favor of The reasons behind this development are manifold. emerging-markets their share in total Partly, it is a consequence of cheaper labor and MNCs sales is bound to rise, too. Thus, as long as 
other direct costs in emerging markets, but it also 
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9: Japanese manufacturers -- current-profitkales 
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the profit-margin differential does not fall, continued 
direct investment should push up sales by emerg- 
ing-markets affiliates, making them even more 
important for their parents' bottom line. 
Japanese earnings still domestically driven 
Compared with their counterparts in the US, 
Japanese corporations are still in the early stage of 
their global expansion. Despite recent hype around 
Japanese foreign investment, in 1992 Japanese 
manufacturing affiliates abroad accounted for a 
mere 6.2% of the total sales by Japanese manufac- 
turers -- up from 4.3% in 1984. US companies 
achieved a similar proportion by the late 1950s. 
Currently, German manufactures produce 20% of 
their output abroad, while US foreign subsidiaries 
account for 28%. 
Moreover, in contrast to the US case, Chart 9 above 
shows that Japanese foreign operations are less 
profitable than domestic ones (although the gap 
must have narrowed during the recent Japanese 
recession). The reason may be rooted, first, in the 
widespread use by Japanese companies of 
"dumping" and "predatory pricing" as a means of 
penetrating new markets abroad and, second, in 
protectionism and a tight oligopolistic structure at 
home. 
The sales and profit-margin data suggest that only 
3% of Japanese manufacturing profits come from 
foreign operations, which implies that the share of 
emerging markets proper is no more than 1-2%. 
The strong Yen now exerts a relentless pressure on 
Japanese companies to relocate production facilities 
1988 1989 1990 1991 
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abroad, particularly to South-East Asia. However, 
this transition will take time and its effect on overall 
corporate profits in Japan will likely be limited for the 
next few years, particularly if the domestic economy 
recovers. 
Investment conclusions 
The rapid expansion of export manufacturing 
capacity in emerging markets will continue to exert a 
disinflationary effect on industrialized countries. 
Emerging markets could very well come to be seen 
as the "fanbelt" which helps to cool off the inflationary 
consequences of rapid growth such as has been 
seen in the US this year. 
The high rates of return available on FDI flows into 
emerging markets will continue to bid up the price of 
capital elsewhere, including emerging equity and 
bond markets. The latter are reliant on foreign port- 
folio capital inflows and are therefore vulnerable to 
such global tightening. 
Investments in such US indices as the S&P 400 
Industrials have a built-in "emerging market play" of 
approximately 20%. This implies that the greater 
volatility of emerging markets may well begin to spill 
over into US stocks, which would therefore warrant 
higher risk premiums and PIE ratios. 
Japanese stocks do not yet offer an emerging 
markets play, except insofar as Japanese subsidiar- 
ies and affiliates are independently listed in 
emerging markets. 
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1 The impact of oi l  
Over the past 30 years, two huge shifts in world 
trade have taken place as a result of changes in oil 
prices. The current changes taking place as a 
result of the growing importance of emerging 
markets are fundamentally different. However, the 
history of the two oil-related cycles helps to put 
present developments in context. 
Chart 2 below demonstrates the powerful impact 
which oil prices have had on patterns of world 
trade in recent years. The 1960s had witnessed a 
remarkable expansion in world trade as a result of 
the Kennedy Round of tariff reductions. The princi- 
pal beneficiaries of this trend were the industrial- 
ized countries, whose exports among themselves 
expanded by an average of 10.7% per annum in 
real terms between 1963 and 1970. Consequently, 
their trade became increasingly concentrated to 
reach a peak in 1970, when 76% of their exports 
were to each other. 
The rise in oil prices which began after the Tehran 
and Tripoli agreements in 1970 and 1972 created 
significant export demand outside the industrial- 
ized countries. For the next decade, the oil export- 
ers (including those developing countries which 
never joined OPEC) were a significant market for 
industrialized countries' exports, accounting for an 
average 14.8% of their total exports between 1974 
and 1982. The collapse in oil prices during the mid- 
1980s greatly diminished this export market. 
A large part of the change in trade patterns during 
the 1970s and 1980s can therefore be attributed to 
shifts in the terms of trade. During most of the 
period, the share of industrialized countries' exports 
going to emerging markets has been in decline or 
has remained relatively constant, as indicated by 
Chart 2 below. The share of industrialized countries' 
exports to emerging markets (excluding oil exporting 
developing countries) was in secular decline until 
the mid-1 970s. 
Two temporary factors resulted in emerging 
markets' ability to import more from industrialized 
countries after the first oil shock. The first was the 
policy of detente with the Soviet Union and China, 
which for the first time since the second world war 
permitted substantial trade in such items as 
American wheat for Soviet gold, diamonds and oil. 
The second factor was the vogue for "recycling" oil 
revenue, whereby western commercial banks lent 
money with no strings attached to developing 
countries. Latin America's ability to import from 
industrialized countries was therefore temporarily 
increased until such time as its debt servicing 
burden increased faster than its export capacity, 
which is what triggered the 1982 debt crisis. 
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